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Abstract:    The adverse distributional effects of a flat tax are well known and 
have been documented by empirical research in several countries, 
including Belgium. Advocates of the flat tax argue, correctly, that 
these studies do not take into account agents’ behavioural reactions 
and possible feed back effects. One of the important effects in this 
context is the potential increase in labour supply and the resulting 
increase in the taxable base and decrease in unemployment 
allowances. In this study we calculate the cost recovery based on a 
micro-simulation model that includes a labour supply model. 
We find that there is indeed a clearly positive effect on labour supply 
and hence also on the tax base. By introducing a revenue-neutral flat 
tax, labour supply increases by approximately 47,000 full-time 
equivalents. However, the effect is limited because, compared to a 
static scenario the cost recovery only allows the revenue-neutral flat 
tax to decrease from 38.5% to 37%. Furthermore, there is little or no 
impact of these employment effects on the strongly regressive nature 
of a flat tax reform.
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Decoster and Van Camp  (2005) have outlined the distributional effects of 
introducing a flat tax in Belgium by means of simulations on a representative sample of 
22,731 tax returns with taxable incomes from 2001 (and thus taxed according to the 
system in force in 2002). Two conclusions can be drawn from their results. First, the a 
priori expectations that a flat tax undermines the progressiveness of the personal 
income tax were confirmed. The lowest incomes lose while the higher incomes gain. A 
revenue-neutral flat tax, with only a basic exemption at the bottom, leads to an 8% to 
10% loss of disposable income for families in the second to fourth deciles, and to a gain 
of 7% for those in the top decile. Even in the most “progressive” scenario, namely 
maintaining the tax reduction for replacement incomes, the effect of the flat tax 
remained regressive. In short, contrary to what is often heard in the popular debate, 
the current personal income tax in effect still redistributes from rich to poor. Recent 
studies for Belgium (Valenduc, 2006), for the United Kingdom (Adam and Brown, 
2006), for Germany (Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer, 2008), for the Netherlands (Jacobs, de 
Mooij and Folmer 2007) and for several European countries (Paulus and Peichl, 2008) 
confirm these results.1  
The second conclusion in Decoster and Van Camp  (2005) is that, to be revenue 
neutral, the flat tax must be in the order of 35 to 40%, depending on the specific 
scenario. In particular - and not surprisingly - the maintenance and the amount of the 
basic exemption levels played an important role in this result. With a purely 
proportional tax, a rate of only 23.5% was needed to obtain revenue neutrality. 
However, the introduction of basic exemptions drove the tax rate up to 34.1%. If the tax 
credits for replacement incomes were also maintained, the rate even rose to 39.5%. One 
of the conclusions in Decoster and Van Camp (2005) is therefore that proposals for 
introducing a flat tax of 20% or 25% in Belgium are either ill-considered2 or based on 
one or more of the following presumptions: 1)  the introduction of significant 
compensating increases in other taxes (e.g. indirect taxes); 2)  unrealistically large 
spending cuts; or 3) substantial cost recovery effects resulting in a budgetary cost of, 
for instance, a 25% flat tax that is much lower than estimated when no behavioural 
effects are taken into account. 
Indeed, the impossibility to estimate these behavioural reactions was one of the 
limitations of the previous study. As the following quote shows, the authors were well 
aware of this fact: 
Whether this high revenue-neutral rate of 40% renders the flat tax debates irrelevant 
is another issue. Our rough estimate of the marginal rates showed that more than 68% 
                                                      
1  Valenduc (2006) describes the distributional effects of a flat tax as: ”Les variations de la 
progressivité et de l’effet redistributif sont en fait plus proches d’un séisme que d’une réforme” (p.69). 
2  For a 25% flat tax rate, we estimated the cost to be €8.9 billion in 2005, keeping in mind that 
only the basic exemptions were maintained. If the reduction for replacement incomes is also 
introduced then a rate of 25% would raise the cost even further to €12.7 billion.   3 
of the fiscal families are now taxed at a marginal rate of more than 40% (Table 3). For 
a large majority of the fiscal families, the flat tax system leads to a potentially much 
higher net return from labour at the margin. This could indeed lead to an increase in 
the labour supply. But the literature indicates small effects as regards the increase in 
the number of hours (see, e.g., Aaberge et al., 1998, for a simulation of a flat tax in 
Italy and Ivanova et al., 2005, for an evaluation of the introduction of the flat tax in 
Russia in 2001). If any effect on the labour supply is to be expected it would have to be 
established through an increased labour-force participation rate of low-paid workers 
who, with the current net wages, are not joining the labour market. However, in that 
case the 40% rate is of course a high marginal tax rate. Therefore, tax cuts for low 
incomes, as introduced in the last tax reform, appear to be a much better tool. It should 
be pointed out that the argument of “cost recovery” reaches further than merely 
labour supply reactions. Tax revenue can also be increased through changes in how 
incomes are declared, see e.g. Feldstein (1995) for empirical evidence following the 
1986 reform in the US. Another possibility is that the taxpayers find it less 
advantageous to evade or avoid taxes. Ivanova et al.’s  (2005) study, for instance, 
demonstrated that the increase in tax revenue after the introduction of the flat tax in 
Russia did not result from an increase in labour supply but rather from less evasion. 
Here we leave open the question as to what extent the Russian experience may apply 
to Belgium. 
Decoster and Van Camp (2005) [translated from Dutch], p. 23 
In this paper we will attempt to fill this significant void. We estimate the effect of 
the introduction of a flat tax, both on the non-active who might enter the labour market 
and on the working population who as a result of the change in the incentives structure 
might work more, less or even leave the labour market. Hence, an econometric model 
explaining the labour supply behaviour of households is needed. This in turn requires 
a dataset in which we observe labour supply for individuals in households. Since this 
is not the case in the fiscal data used in Decoster and Van Camp (2005), in this paper 
we work with the budget surveys of the Belgian National Institute for Statistics (NIS). 
This switch from the fiscal data to the budget survey data also comes at a price: the 
details of the tax return, like the declared professional costs, other allowances or the 
direct observation of the taxable income, are lost.3 On the other hand, budget survey 
data contain detailed information on household expenditures that can be exploited to 
assess the effects on indirect tax revenues. 
By taking up potential labour supply effects, the results in this paper allow to verify 
how much lower the revenue-neutral flat tax could be if the feedback effects are taken 
into account. Unfortunately, the other limitations mentioned in the above quote 
remain. Changes in evasion or avoidance behaviour or the shift from taxable income to 
other forms of declaration are not modelled. Furthermore, the labour supply model 
itself is a partial model. It only focuses on the supply side of the labour market, making 
the implicit assumption that labour demand is infinitely elastic. All of the predicted 
                                                      
3  For a detailed analysis of the distribution of some of these deductions through the income 
distribution, see Decoster and Van Camp (2005).   4 
expansion of labour supply will find a matching labour demand. This is clearly an 
oversimplification of reality, since demand side constraints (especially in some 
geographical regions) may counter the potential expansion of the additional labour 
supply. Our estimates of changes in labour supply of the cost recovery must therefore 
be interpreted as upper limits. 4 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
advantages and limitations of the dataset used, the way in which the taxes were 
calculated by means of a micro-simulation model and how labour supply has been 
modelled. In section 3 we first replicate the flat tax calculations in Decoster and Van 
Camp (2005) using the budget survey data. This section discusses the results of the 
revenue-neutral flat taxes without labour supply reactions and describes average and 
marginal personal income tax rates across the income distribution. These calculations 
serve as the reference scenario with which the results from section  4 can then be 
compared. Economic agents’ labour supply reactions following the introduction of a 
flat tax are analysed in section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The “neglect” of behavioural effects in Decoster and Van Camp (2005) was due to 
the use of otherwise very valuable fiscal data. The Belgian fiscal data set contains 
taxable income and very detailed elements from the tax declaration, but no information 
on labour supply. Accounting for behavioural reactions therefore required working 
with a dataset that contains (among other things) information on whether people are 
active on the labour market and preferably also the number of hours they work. The 
budget surveys of the Belgian Statistical Institute used here contain, besides the 
required labour market status, a wealth of other socio-economic and expenditure data 
for a representative sample of Belgian households. 
We made a distinction between the sample used to estimate the labour supply 
model, and the sample on which we simulate the effect of the tax change. For the 
former we wanted to have a sample as big as possible. Therefore we pooled four 
budget surveys: the ones of 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 providing us with 15001 
households and 34758 individuals. For the simulation, the sample was restricted to the 
2002 survey only, containing information on 3,720 households and 8,340 individuals. 
Since the budget surveys only contain net or disposable household income (after 
taxes) and not gross income, we first used the micro-simulation model described in the 
next paragraph to reconstruct gross incomes from net earnings. This backward 
                                                      
4  We also neglect other effects further down the road, such as changes in equilibrium wages 
following the change in labour supply. Some of these general equilibrium effects following 
the introduction of a flat tax have been analysed in e.g. Ventura (1999) and Altig, Auerbach, 
Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001).   5 
calculation was based on the fiscal and parafiscal regulations of the year of the survey 
itself.5 
Once a representative sample with gross incomes was available, the Belgian module 
of the micro-simulation model EUROMOD was used to calculate the personal income tax 
in the baseline scenario.6 This baseline was defined as the 2005 Belgian personal 
income tax system. Since the simulations were performed on the 2002 survey only, 
with income data from 2002, we inflated all nominal income variables using the CPI 
between June 2002 and June 2005 (factor 1.072). This baseline scenario has then been 
compared with the net incomes obtained after the introduction of flat taxes. The 
simulations include a proportional flat tax in which also the basic exemptions are 
removed, and the more realistic scenario in which this basic exemption remains in 
place. 
Removal of all other tax reductions and exemptions in practice boils down to the 
removal of the tax reduction for replacement incomes and of the marital quotient (or 
“splitting” rule ) allowing one earner households to transfer part of labour income to 
the non working spouse. For the calculation of other important and less important tax 
reductions, like those related to mortgage loans, pension saving, and so on, either there 
is no information in the budget survey or no calculation module in EUROMOD. The 
focus of this paper being on the effects of labour supply, this limitation seems not too 
dramatic. 
The flat tax with a basic exemption level only contains two policy parameters: the 
exemption level and the marginal rate. Imposing budget neutrality therefore must be 
carried out by varying these parameters. We decided to endogenise the flat tax rate and 
maintain the exemption level.7 The basic exemptions are those from the reference 
scenario (€5,780 per adult and €1,230, €1,930, €3,920 and €4,370 respectively for the 
first, second, third and fourth and other dependent children). 
The behavioural reaction to the tax change on labour supply was modelled by 
means of a –by now more or less standard– discrete choice model. This relates the 
information on labour supply in the budget survey to explanatory variables such as the 
gross hourly wages, non-labour incomes, tax parameters and socio-economic 
characteristics of the individual and family (gender, region, level of education, etc.). 
The model used for estimating and predicting the labour supply is a discrete probit 
                                                      
5   The  microsimulation  model  EUROMOD  contains a module which performs this backward 
calculation. It is an “ad hoc” procedure which starts from a first guess for the gross income 
of a household. EUROMOD  then  calculates the corresponding disposable income. A 
comparison of this calculated disposable household income with the registered one is then 
used to update the first guess of household gross income in an iterative process until some 
criterion of convergence is met. 
6  For a discussion of EUROMOD,  see Sutherland (2001). 
7   See Davies and Hoy (2002) for a formal treatment of the relation between the two available 
parameters in the context of revenue neutral reforms, and the application in Paulus and 
Peichl (2008).   6 
model. This means that the individual's choice set is not modelled in a (nearly) 
continuous  way (e.g. the number of hours per week, subdivided into very small 
intervals), but as a limited number of discrete choices. In our application, the choice 
possibilities are limited to three: not working, working half-time and working full-
time.The version of the model estimated here is described in detail in Orsini (2006a, 
2008) and summarized briefly in appendix 7.1. 
To estimate labour supply, we pooled budget surveys for four different years: 1999, 
2000, 2001 and 2002 amounting to a total number of 34,758 individual observations. It 
is obvious, however, that the labour supply was not modelled for individuals, like 
pensioners, who have left the labour market. Also other, smaller, groups are not 
modelled for several reasons. For the self-employed, for instance, both the concept of 
gross hourly wages and the variable “labour supply” as a number of contractually 
fixed hours per week poses problems. The labour supply model was therefore only 
estimated for salary and wage earners who may be potentially active on the labour 
market. In our application these are people between 18 and 65 who are not students or 
in any other way unavailable for the labour market (e.g. retired, disabled, etc.). At the 
household level, we also excluded mixed cases like individuals married to a retired 
person or a self-employed. In the end, we were able to explain and predict labour 
supply for four groups of individuals available for the labour market: single men, 
single women, men in couples and women in couples. 
Indirect taxes are not (yet) modelled in EUROMOD.8 To add in this additional effect 
on revenues, we applied the indirect tax legislation – VAT-rates, excise taxes and ad-
valorem taxes– of the year 2005 at the most disaggregated level of expenditures found 
in the budget survey of 2002 and calculated indirect tax rates on 16  aggregated 
commodity groups assuming fixed producer prices.9 These aggregate indirect tax rates 
were then used to determine indirect tax liabilities before and after the reform, taking 
into account changes in consumption, induced by eventual changes in disposable 
incomes.  
We assumed that changes in disposable income due to the introduction of a flat tax 
are fully absorbed by changes in the consumption of non-durable consumption goods, 
i.e. expenditures on durable goods and saving are kept constant.10 The consumption 
changes were calculated by means of Engel curves that were estimated on the 2002 
budget survey for 15  commodity groups (excluding durables) on the 2002 budget 
survey. The aggregate indirect tax rates were then used to determine indirect tax 
liabilities for the pre- and post reform expenditures. 
                                                      
8   Extending EUROMOD with indirect tax calculations is part of the EU-funded project called 
AIM-AP: “Accurate Income Measurement for the Assessment of Public Policies” (Contract 
no 028412); see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/aim-ap/project3.php. 
9   For a thorough and detailed description of this procedure see Decoster et al. (2007). 
10  In the analysis without behavioural effects the implicit assumption is that all changes in 
disposable income are (dis)saved.   7 
Note that, in this paper, we confine the role of expenditures and indirect taxes to 
their effect on government revenues. We do take indirect taxes into account to calculate 
cost recovery effects of the flat tax and to determine a revenue neutral rate. But we do 
not use the changes in consumption to go beyond disposable income as a crude proxy 
of welfare changes. 11 
3  AVERAGE AND MARGINAL RATES IN THE BASIC SCENARIO 
3.1   AVERAGE TAX RATES IN THE BELGIAN PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
For each family in the budget survey of 2002 we calculated by means of EUROMOD 
the average tax rate of the Belgian personal income tax. This average tax rate was 
obtained by dividing the personal income tax liability of the household by the sum of 
all taxable income in the household (after deducting work related expenses according 
to the fixed rate structure). 
The average tax rate for all families in the budget survey is estimated at 17.5%. This 
is higher than the average of 15.7% obtained on the fiscal data in Decoster and Van 
Camp (2005). 12 Yet, the calculations based on the budget survey refer to the tax system 
after the personal income tax reform of 2001 which substantially lowered the average 
tax liability. One of the reasons for this is, of course, that in the budget survey we 
cannot take into account the myriad of real world tax reductions. Moreover, the 
household concept in the budget survey refers to a sociological family which is 
fundamentally different from the fiscal units in the fiscal data. 
                                                      
11  Remark that, for simplicity, we only consider real income and not relative price effects to 
derive the changes in consumption, and that we do not attempt at estimating a full demand 
system at this stage. For a more in-depth analysis of the effects of simultaneous changes in 
disposable income, leisure and consumption on the distribution of welfare, see Capéau, 
Decoster, De Swerdt and Orsini (2008). 
12  The calculation of the tax liability on the fiscal data in Decoster and Van Camp (2005) was 
done by the research department of the the Belgian Ministry of Finance by means of the SIRe 
micro-simulation model, see Standaert and Valenduc (1996).   8 
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF THE AVERAGE TAX RATES IN CLASSES 
% of families with an average tax rate 
in this class 
Cumulative % 
class 
budget survey  fiscal data  budget survey  fiscal data 
0  17.8  17.8  17.8  17.8 
0 to 5%  8.3  12.0  26.1  29.8 
5 to 10%  7.3  9.5  33.4  39.3 
10 to 15%  9.1  8.5  42.5  47.8 
15 to 20%  10.7  9.6  53.2  57.4 
20 to 25%  13.1  12.8  66.3  70.2 
25 to 30%  13.6  15.7  79.9  85.9 
30 to 35%  10.1  9.8  90.0  95.7 
35 to 40%  6.7  3.4  96.7  99.1 
40 to 45%  2.9  0.7  99.6  99.8 
45 to 50%  0.4  0.2  100.0  100.0 
> 50%  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0 
Note: the average tax rate is calculated based on the taxable income after deduction of the fixed 
working related expenses. The calculations on the budget survey refer to the tax system 
of 2005, the ones on the fiscal data to the 2001 system. In the budget survey, the unit of 
observation is a sociological family, in the fiscal data, it is a fiscal family. 
Table 1 compares the distribution of the average tax rate obtained from the budget 
survey with the distribution reported in Decoster and Van Camp (2005) on the fiscal 
data. The distribution of the average tax rates obtained from the budget survey in this 
reference scenario seems reasonable and reliable enough to be used as a benchmark of 
comparison for the flat tax simulations. Both datasets confirm the remarkable 
observation that over half the families face an average tax rate in the personal income 
tax of less than 20%.13 Part of the explanation is the inclusion of the large group of 
families (almost 18%) who pay no personal income tax at all. 
Table 2 structures the same micro-information about average tax rates in different 
ways. We describe the average tax rate across deciles of equivalent disposable income, 
by most important source of income and by household type. Disposable income is the 
income after subtraction of the personal income tax liability. The equivalence scale is 
the square root of the number of persons in the household. 
The comparison with calculations on the fiscal dataset again allows for an optimistic 
conclusion as regards the reliability of the reference scenario in the budget survey. The 
average tax rate rises through the deciles making the personal income tax system 
distinctly progressive (confirming Decoster and Van Camp,  2005). Only for the top 
deciles the average tax in the budget survey exceeds the one in the fiscal data. This is 
undoubtedly explained by the impossibility to take into account many tax reliefs in our 
                                                      
13  For a global picture of taxes on labour income, including social security contributions, see 
Decoster et al. (2008).   9 
budget survey calculations. In Decoster and Van Camp  (2005) we showed that the 
switch from ‘lump sum’ to ‘actual’ (and proven) work related expenses mainly occurs 
in the highest decile.14 
The importance of taking into account these proven work related expenses to 
measure how progressive the personal income tax system is, is also confirmed in the 
second part of Table 2. Only a negligible fraction of wage and salary earners declares 
actual expenses. The large majority opts for the legally provided fixed rate scheme 
instead. Consequently, our estimated average tax rate for the wage and salary earners 
in the budget survey (22.3%) comes remarkably close to that obtained through the 
fiscal data (22.2%). The same holds for families for whom the most important income is 
the replacement income. For those families whose main source of income is self-
employment income, however, the average tax rate (30.1%) strongly deviates from that 
obtained in the fiscal data (12.2%). The study of fiscal data indeed revealed that two-
thirds of fiscal families with mainly self-employment income declare actual incurred 
work related expenses rather than make use of the fixed deduction sheme provided for 
in the tax legislation. 
The subdivision into family types based on the family's composition and age could 
be carried out in much greater detail in the budget survey than in the fiscal data. Age, 
for instance, was not available in the fiscal data. The results for this classification are 
therefore less comparable between the two datasets. Couples face a higher average tax 
rate than single people. Only the large families (three children or more) see their tax 
rate diminish substantially. Older single individuals have a much lower tax rate. It 
goes without saying that this univariate analysis does not correct for differences in 
taxable income between these socio-economic categories. 
                                                      
14  See Tables 7 and 8 in Decoster and Van Camp (2005). The average of the proven expenses 
amounts to €3,910 for all fiscal families, but in the highest decile, it is €25,592. The other 
deductions also increase with income, although to a lesser extent than proven work related 
expenses.   10 
TABLE 2:  AVERAGE TAX RATES IN THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX FOR DECILES AND FOR SOCIO-
ECONOMIC GROUPS (IN %) 
average tax rate 
  budget survey  fiscal data 
all families  17.6  15.7 
according to decile 
1  1.1  0.4 
2  3.3  3.1 
3  8.2  5.5 
4  11.6  11.2 
5  15.9  16.5 
6  20.3  21.2 
7  23.9  24.2 
8  27.4  26.5 
9  31.3  28.6 
10  37.3  28.1 
according to income type 
wages and salaries  22.3  22.2 
replacement incomes  8.7  7.3 
self-employment incomes  30.1  12.2 
mixed incomes  10.8  17.8 
according to family type 
   in  budget 
survey 
in fiscal data 
single, <65, no children  13.6   




couple, <65, no children    22.5   
couple, <65, 1 child    23.8   
couple, <65, 2 children    24.8   
couple, <65, 3+ children    17.8   
couple, >= 65, no children    12.2   
couple, >= 65, with children    14.4   
 single-income    10.7 
 double-income   20.1 
Note:  to calculate the average tax rate, see note Table 1. The deciles contain 10% 
of the population, sorted by equivalent disposable income. The age 
classification is based on the age of the head of the family. 
3.2   DOES WORK PAY? 
The average tax rate does not tell the whole story. More important, especially with 
respect to labour supply, is the marginal tax rate. It is the key variable for labour 
supply at the “intensive” margin, i.e. for those who are already working. At least as 
important, however, is the participation tax rate. This shows the part of income taxed   11 
away by the joint working of the tax and benefit system when moving from inactivity 
to employment. Therefore, this participation tax rate is crucial in explaining the 
participation decision or the labour supply decision at what is called the “extensive 
margin”. The micro-simulation model allows to calculate both marginal tax rates and 
participation tax rates at the individual level. Since we no longer compare with the 
fiscal data source and contrary to the results shown in Table 1 and 2, we also include 
the employee's contribution to social security here. 
The results are shown in Table 3 in the form of distributions of the individuals over 
different tax rate brackets, both for the marginal tax rate (under the heading “hours”), 
and for the participation tax rate (under the heading “particip”). For calculating the 
marginal tax rate we had a working person working one extra hour. The marginal tax 
rate is then obtained as one minus the difference in available income divided by the 
additional earned income following the extra hour of work. The participation tax rate 
is derived from the difference in net income when working full-time as opposed to not 
working divided by earned income. 
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF MARGINAL AND PARTICIPATION TAX RATES 
% of the subgroup belonging to a bracket of marginal rates 





hours particip. Hours particip.  Hours particip.  hours particip. 
(  0;10]  0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(10;20]  6.8 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(20;30]  0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(30;40]  1.7 1.5 4.4 3.0 3.4 2.3 2.0 4.5 
(40;50]  23.2 7.8 21.2 5.4 32.9  14.9  25.3 8.3 
(50;60]  52.0 11.1 54.0 20.8 48.0 33.0 58.3 10.4 
(60;70]  1.1 33.0 1.8 41.6 1.4 37.2 1.0 10.9 
(70;80]  2.6 39.9 0.5 23.0 1.5 9.5 2.0  23.7 
(80;90]  4.6 5.3 3.8 6.2 2.4 2.4 1.5  30.3 
(90;∞]  7.3 0.0  11.6  0.0 9.1 0.8  10.0  11.9 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The difference from Table 1 is obvious: the majority of individuals in each of the 
four groups face marginal and participation tax rates of more than 50%. Of course, this 
difference with Table 1 is partly explained by the fact that social security contributions 
are taken into account. But still, the much smaller spread is noticeable. Take, for 
instance, the marginal tax rate at the intensive margin for singles. More than half of 
these persons face tax rates between 50% and 60%. For men in couples, this is as high 
as 58%. The comparison between the marginal tax rates at the intensive and extensive 
margin shows that the latter are even higher. Slightly less than 40% of non active 
women face participation tax rates between 70% and 80%. In the category of non-active   12 
single men we also find almost two-thirds (of, indeed, a smaller group) with tax rates 
varying between 60% and 80%. 
4  A REVENUE-NEUTRAL FLAT TAX WITHOUT BEHAVIOURAL EFFECTS 
Before considering the feedback effects of the introduction of a flat tax, we examine 
the flat tax scenarios without behavioural effects. According to the National Institute for 
Statistics, the personal income tax revenue amounted to €35,298 billion in 2005. As can 
be seen in the first column of Table 4, we slightly overestimate the baseline tax revenue 
in the budget survey (€38,902 billion). All revenue-neutral flat taxes are defined with 
respect to this point of reference. 





flat tax with 
exemptions 
flat rate (in %)  -  26.0  38.50 
personal income tax revenue  38,904  38,640  38,897 
employee social contribution revenue   14,671  14,671  14,671 
employer social contribution revenue   21,755  21,755  21,755 
expenses guaranteed minimum income benefit  2,376  3,299  2,838 
expenses unemployment benefit  6,650  6,650  6,650 
indirect tax revenue  12,069  12,069  12,069 
Net Budget  78,373  77,186  77,904 
We calculated the effects of two flat taxes: a strictly proportional tax and a constant 
marginal rate above an exemption level. The exemptions are those from the current 
system and are applied as a tax reduction, calculated as the tax amount due on this 
exempted income (without refunding however). The results are shown in Tables 4 (for 
the revenues) and 5 (for the distributional effects). 
The first line of Table 4 displays the flat tax rate needed to reach revenue neutrality 
with respect to the baseline situation in the first column. For the strictly proportional 
tax in the second column, we defined revenue neutrality with respect to the personal 
income tax revenues only. In that case, the tax must be set at 26%. As expected, the 
distributional effects of this proportional tax, as shown in Table 5, are disastrous for the 
lower half of the income distribution. Compared to an average gain of 1.3% in 
disposable income for the population as a whole, there is a 10% loss for the poorest 
40% of the population and a gain of almost 21% for the richest  10%.15 Since the 
proportional tax removes all progression from the personal income tax, this effect once 
more reveals the fact that the current personal income tax system is still genuinely 
                                                      
15  In the lower half of the distribution, replacement income (including pensions) represents a 
considerable share of disposable income.   13 
progressive, and hence redistributive. The results in the first column of Table 5 simply 
restate the increasing average tax rates in the baseline of Table 2. 
TABLE 5: DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF REVENUE-NEUTRAL FLAT TAXES  




flat taxes with 
exemptions 
flat rate (in %)  26.0  38.5 
% change available income of all families  1.3  0.5 
by decile 
1  -12.5 -1.8 
2  -12.7 -5.0 
3  -13.6 -8.1 
4  -10.9 -5.4 
5  -7.8 -3.9 
6  -4.4 -2.4 
7  -0.7 -0.2 
8  3.0 1.0 
9  8.9 3.7 
10  20.6 9.4 
by income type 
wages and salaries  2.1 1.5 
replacement incomes  -10.1 -6.5 
self-employment incomes  12.9 6.3 
mixed incomes  29.5 13.8 
by family type 
single, <65, no children  -3.3 3.2 
single, <65, with children  -5.1 3.5 
single, >=65  -12.5 -1.6 
couple, <65, no children  5.2 0.1 
couple, <65, 1 child  4.3 1.3 
couple, <65, 2 children  5.8 2.9 
couple, <65, >=3 children  0.1 1.4 
couple, >= 65, no children  -7.6 -9.8 
couple, >= 65, with children  -7.0 -7.6 
This drastic loss of disposable income in the bottom half of the distribution is also 
reflected in the expenses for the guaranteed minimum income benefit. These increase 
from € 2,376 million to € 3,299 million under this proportional tax scenario.16 Hence, 
even in a model with no behavioural effects on the labour supply side, a first likely 
feedback effect has been identified. 
                                                      
16   The model does not model any behaviour for the take-up of this minimum income 
guarantee. It is attributed to everyone who qualifies for it, based on a comparison of the 
incomes with the subsistence level for the category of families to which the individual 
belongs. It is thus an upper limit for these expenses.   14 
Politically, the scenario of a proportional tax seems highly unlikely. In the second 
flat tax we therefore reintroduce the exemptions of the baseline system. Furthermore, 
the second flat tax is made revenue-neutral with respect to the net budgetary effect 
exclusive of guaranteed minimum income benefit expenses, that is the sum of personal 
income taxes, indirect taxes, employee social security contributions, and employer 
social security contributions, less unemployment benefits. These results, displayed in 
the third column of Table 4 again confirm the results from Decoster and Van Camp 
(2005): 
−  The introduction of basic exemptions causes the revenue-neutral flat tax rate to rise 
substantially: to make it more or less revenue neutral we now need a rate of  38.5%. 
As can be derived from the right column of Table  4, the expenses for the 
guaranteed minimum income benefit again drop to €2,838 million but still remain 
€462 million above the expenses in the basic scenario. 
−  A flat tax with exemptions avoids the social carnage of the first column in Table 5, 
but also the gains of this reform remain strongly regressive. The average gain of 
0.5% hides a large variation. Only the upper three deciles benefit with respect to 
disposable income. All other deciles lose. The disposable income of the top decile 
increases by 9.4%, but the loss in the deciles 2, 3 and 4 still amounts to 5% and 
more. 
−  Introduction of the basic exemption levels does not compensate the tax reliefs for 
replacement incomes (which are still removed). Since households with replacement 
incomes are mainly found in the lowest three deciles, this also explains the pattern 
of the losses according to income. 
−  On average, the flat tax reform redistributes from households with replacement 
incomes to families with income from self-employment activity. On average, the 
wage and salary earners experience a small gain. 
−  The younger gain, the older lose. 
The important question now is whether this high price in terms of distribution can 
be justified by a substantial gain in efficiency. This is the subject of the next section, 
where we will investigate the labour supply effect of the tax reform. 
5  EFFECTS OF A FLAT TAX ON LABOUR SUPPLY 
In public policy debates, the “efficiency” argument is often reduced to “cost-
recovery” effects. In short, advocates of the flat tax consider the above increase of the 
flat tax rate to 38.5% unrealistically high since the flat tax might induce more people to 
enter the labour market and/or to increase their labour supply. This in turn will 
increase the taxable base and hence allow a lower revenue neutral flat tax rate. In this 
section we first discuss this cost-recovery effect. The next subsection focuses on the 
reactions with regard to labour market participation and/or hours of work   15 
(section 5.2). In section 5.3 we verify whether accounting for labour supply reactions 
modifies the above-mentioned distributional effects of the introduction of a flat tax. 
5.1   HOW STRONG IS THE COST-RECOVERY EFFECT? 
We first keep the flat tax rate at the above-mentioned level of 38.5% and compare 
the budgetary effects with and without labour supply reactions. Probably, this most 
closely resembles what policy makers refer to as the “cost-recovery effect”.17 
TABLE 6: BUDGET CHANGE THROUGH INTRODUCTION OF LABOUR SUPPLY REACTIONS (IN MILLION €) 
Description 
(1)  














change in million € 
compared to (1) 
change in 
million € 
compared to (2) 
personal income tax  38,743  369  -1473 
employee social contributions  14,735  198  21 
employer social contributions  20,685  441  45 
guaranteed minimum income benefit  3,032  10  -61 
unemployment benefit  6,304  -98  -9 
indirect tax revenue  12,325  109  189 
net effect on the budget  77,152  1,205  -1,148 
The first column in Table 6 replicates the baseline –the revenue neutral flat tax of 
38.5%– but starting from the calibrated labour supply model (see appendix  7.1 for 
more details).18 The second column shows the change in revenues and government 
spending if we introduce labour supply effects. There are indeed substantial feedback 
effects that are not accounted for in a strict impact analysis. The increase of both 
personal income tax (€369  million or 0.95%) and social security contributions 
(€639 million or 1.8%) on the one hand and the decrease in unemployment benefits (by 
€98 million or 1.6%) on the other hand, indicate that, on average, there is increased 
activity on the labour market. We also take up the effect of increased dispos able 
income on indirect tax revenues (€109  million or 0.88%). Taken together, there is a 
                                                      
17   In the public debate one refers to the “cost recovery” of a tax reduction as the percentage of 
the initial forgone tax revenue which is earned back through the interplay of behavioural 
and general equilibrium effects. Of course, if we first determine the tax rate as revenue 
neutral, the forgone revenue equals zero, and the percentage cost recovery measure makes 
no sense. In appendix 7.2 we therefore also give some numerical values of the cost recovery 
for non revenue neutral reforms. 
18  With “calibrated” we refer to the fact that the baseline is calculated using the probabilities, 
and hence the stochastic nature, of the labour supply model as described in appendix 7.1. 
We opted to present results this way for consistency.   16 
budget surplus of €1,205  million because of changes in behaviour compared to the 
situation in which behavioural changes are not taken into account. 
Another way to look at this cost recovery effect, is to calculate how much the 
previously revenue neutral flat tax rate of 38.5% can be lowered if additional revenues 
are taken into account. In terms of Table 6, the extra revenue of €1,205 million (last line 
of the second column) can be used to reduce the 38.5% rate and still remain budgetary 
neutral. This is shown in the rightmost column of Table 6. It shows the difference in 
revenues and government spending by moving from a 38.5% rate to a 37% rate, again 
taking into account labour supply effects. Expressed in this way, the cost recovery 
effect is much less spectacular. Lowering the rate with 1.5  percentage point 
immediately eats away 1,473 million of the budget surplus of 1,205 million. The reason 
is of course that the reduction with 1.5 percentage point bears on the entire taxable base 
of personal income taxes and not only on the additional tax base created in the 
previous step. Although part of the loss is recovered through more favourable changes 
in other revenues and spending, this once more illustrates that proposals endorsing a 
flat tax rate of 25% based on cost-recovery arguments, can only be labeled populistic. 
Presumably, the labour supply reaction will not be equally distributed across the 
population. In the next section we examine in detail the labour supply reactions. The 
results in the following two sections are calculated using the new revenue-neutral flat 
tax rate of 37%. 
5.2   WHO REACTS TO THE STIMULUS OF THE FLAT TAX? 
As described in appendix 7.1, labour supply is modelled separately for single men, 
single women, and men and women in couples. In addition, aside from the net wages, 
other explanatory variables like age, education and the number of children are used to 
account for the observed labour supply. This allows for a disaggregated picture of 
labour supply reactions. 
In Table 7, the mechanism of the labour supply model is illustrated by means of 
elasticities for different groups. The column with the heading “all” contains two 
elasticities for each modelled subgroup. The “participation elasticity” reflects the 
change in the degree of participation (in percentage points) following a 1% increase in 
the gross hourly wages (and an unchanged tax system). This concept summarises the 
extent to which an increase in the gross hourly wages will encourage the non-active to 
enter the labour market or, although less probable, will motivate the active to leave the 
labour market. The “hours elasticity” adds the reaction of individuals who are already 
active to the previous “extensive margin”. Those currently working may choose to 
work more or less. The hours elasticity shown in Table 7 shows the percentage change 
of the total number of hours worked by each subgroup following the same 1% increase 
in the gross hourly wages. Note that the hours elasticity represented here is the 
cumulative effect of changes at the intensive and at the extensive margin. It contains   17 
both the participation elasticity (in which the change in labour market participation is 
expressed in number of hours) and the reaction of those who are already working. 
The elasticities are in line with estimates reported in the literature for other 
countries.19 The largest labour supply reaction is found among women. An increase in 
the gross hourly wages by 1% causes the labour supply to increase by 0.27% for single 
women and even 0.30% for women in couples. For men, the elasticity is 0.29% when 
single but only 0.08% when living with a partner. The labour supply reaction is mainly 
driven by the change in labour market participation and to a much lesser extent by a 
change in the labour supply of those who are already working. 
TABLE 7: LABOUR SUPPLY ELASTICITIES FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS 






Q2 Q3 Q4 
(highest 
25%) 
 Single  men 
participation  rate  (%)  75.54 12.23 94.82 99.06 96.27 
participation elasticity  0.27  2.58  0.09  0.02  0.00 
hours elasticity  0.29  3.56  0.08  0.03  0.00 
 Single  women 
participation  rate  (%)  74.05 11.97 87.48 97.00  100.00 
participation elasticity  0.30  2.66  0.22  0.00  0.00 
hours elasticity  0.27  4.53  0.23  -0.02  -0.18 
  Men in couples 
participation  rate  (%)  93.82 84.59 96.94 95.58 98.16 
participation elasticity  0.07  0.26  0.02  0.03  0.00 
hours elasticity  0.08  0.29  0.03  0.04  0.01 
  Women in couples 
participation  rate  (%)  63.63 16.44 69.77 83.16 85.24 
participation elasticity  0.27  1.74  0.25  0.09  0.08 
hours elasticity  0.30  2.13  0.30  0.14  0.10 
In addition to the distinction between the four subgroups in the horizontal panels of 
Table 7, we also show the reactions for different groups in the distribution of gross 
incomes. The underlying population of modelled individuals is divided into four 
quartiles from low to high gross labour income. The difference in labour supply 
reaction is obvious. The positive reaction comes mainly from the lowest quartile. In 
                                                      
19  See e.g. the recent overview in Orsini (2006b, 2008).   18 
contrast, for women with high incomes we observe a “backward bending” labour 
supply curve.20 
The introduction of a flat tax modifies the net gain of employment and hence the 
choice whether or not to supply labour and, if supplied, how much. Table 8 shows the 
employment effects of introducing a flat tax of 37%. We again distinguish between the 
effects on participation and the (combined) effect on the number of hours by including 
the reaction of those who are already working. 
TABLE 8: EFFECTS OF THE FLAT TAX ON LABOUR SUPPLY 
  basic scenario  flat tax  difference in 
units 
difference in % 
Employment      
single women  316,439  318,751  2,312  0.7 
single men  255,112  259,274  4,162  1.6 
women in couples  815,170  853,723  38,553  4.7 
men in couples  1,202,244  1,204,567  2,323  0.2 
Total employment  2,588,965  2,636,315  47,350  1.8 
        
Hours        
single women  10,902,404  11,028,722  126,318  1.2 
single men  9,695,688  9,931,213  235,525  2.4 
Women in couples  25,054,267  26,399,587  1,345,320  5.4 
men in couples  46,865,730  47,051,780  186,050  0.4 
Total number of hours  92,518,089  94,411,302  1,893,213  2.0 
Total FTE  2,312,952 2,360,283  47,330  2.0 
In the baseline situation the model produces an employment of 2,588,965 working 
people, or 2,312,952 full-time equivalents. According to the labour supply model, 
introducing a flat tax of 37% causes a net increase of 47,350 units or 1.8%. By far the 
largest reaction (38,553 units or a 4.7% increase in employment) is found among 
women in couples. Needless to emphasise again that this is a reaction of labour supply, 
without taking into account the demand side of the labour market. In other words, this 
(net) effect identifies those who did not find it profitable to offer labour before the 
introduction of a flat tax, but do so after the introduction. The demand side of the 
labour market is not modelled and it is therefore not possible to predict whether this 
increased labour supply will meet a matching labour demand. In the lower part of 
Table 8, we add the effect of people who were already working. This causes the overall 
increase in the labour supply to rise further from 1.8% to 2.0%. 
                                                      
20  A more thorough statistical analysis of these labour supply effects could, in fact, reveal that 
not all of these effects are also statistically significant. The confidence intervals for the 
estimates of this labour supply model have not yet been calculated.   19 
5.3  DO LABOUR SUPPLY REACTIONS MODIFY THE ADVERSE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
OF A FLAT TAX? 
The advantages of a behavioural micro-simulation model lie in the possibility to 
account for the heterogeneity of individuals and families in the population. Table 7 
clearly shows that the labour supply reaction varies among the different groups and 
according to the gross hourly wage. In this subsection we therefore investigate whether 
the labour supply reaction could amend the strongly regressive effects of a flat tax. 
Table 9 describes the characteristics of the modelled subpopulation in terms of their 
labour supply reaction. Each row of the table represents a subgroup according to the 
size of the labour supply reaction, and each column describes a characteristic of the 
individuals in this specific subgroup. This allows portraying the different groups of 
people who react to the modified incentives. The fifth row, for instance, contains the 
group of individuals for whom the labour supply slightly decreases with the 
introduction of the flat tax (a decrease of between 2.5 and 0.1 hours per week).21 This 
group makes up 10.3% of the modelled population and comprises 95.9% of individuals 
who are in couples. A comparison with the last line in the table shows that individuals 
from couples are overrepresented in this group. 
Table 9 shows that the majority of individuals hardly reacts if at all to the change in 
net income out of work: 50.7% of the subpopulation shows a change in the weekly 
labour supply between -0.1 and +0.1 hours (middle row in the table). Individuals who 
do react positively to the introduction of a flat tax are mainly women (since men are 
underrepresented in these groups) who live with a partner (because couples are 
overrepresented). Their gross income is slightly higher than average. Surprisingly, 
gross hourly wage does not vary monotonically across the range of labour supply 
reactions. We find high gross wages among those who have a strong negative reaction 
and among those who have a strong positive reaction. The small group that has the 
strongest negative reactions (first line) comprises men in couples with a high gross 
w a g e .  Y e t ,  t h e  n e x t ,  a l s o  s m a l l ,  g r o u p  w i t h  a  s t r o n g  n e g a t i v e  r e a c t i o n  c o n s i s t s  o f  
women with children but with a low gross wage. 
It cannot be precluded that this varied pattern of the labour supply reaction also 
affects the conclusions on the distributional impact of introducing a flat tax. Table 10 
compares the distributional effects of a revenue-neutral flat tax reform both without 
and with labour supply reactions. Note that in doing so, we switch again from the 
subpopulation of modelled individuals to the full population (including e.g. the 
pensioners) and to a representation at the household level. The table shows the 
percentage change in disposable income. 
                                                      
21  As the labour supply model is a discrete choice model, each possible option receives a 
certain probability. The individual prediction of labour supply thus relates to an expected 
value based on these probabilities (and the changes thereof). Therefore, at the individual 
level, we sometimes find small reactions.   20 


























income in € 
per month 
(-∞; -10]  814 0.0  100.0  100.0  43.0  3.0  24.9  8002 
(-10;-7.5]  853 0.0  49.1  0.0  32.0  0.0  7.6  4801 
(-7.5;-5]  1834 0.1  100.0  76.5  58.5  0.5  14.6  3782 
(-5;-2.5]  7084 0.3  100.0  43.5  48.7  0.1  14.7  3558 
(-2.5;-0.1]  272814 10.3 95.9  65.4  41.6  1.2  12.2 2482 
(-0.1;0.1]  1336466 50.7 76.2  58.7  40.6  1.2  12.8  2490 
(0.1;2.5]  792097 30.0 73.6  33.7  41.4  1.2  14.3 2764 
(2.5;5]  132473 5.0 81.6  21.0  45.3  1.1  13.7 2329 
(5;7.5]  69406 2.6  85.2  23.3  47.2  1.0  14.8  2315 
(7.5;10]  15452 0.6  88.0  17.8  44.5  0.7  14.2  2024 
(10, ∞]  6826 0.3  100.0  44.8  50.8  0.0  14.3  1916 
all  2636119 100.0 78.3  48.7  41.4  1.2 13.3  2561 
Here, too, the conclusion is qualified. The average gain increases (from 1.3% to 
2.5%) since the revenue neutral rate goes down from 38.5% to 37%. The labour supply 
effects mitigate the regressive nature of the gains from the flat tax reform in disposable 
income terms. Still, the broad pattern of adverse distributional consequences remains: 
the lower half of the income distribution, and especially replacement incomes and 
older people, lose. The gain of disposable income of the top three deciles is even 
reinforced. 
Note that this analysis only takes into account the change in disposable income. It is 
self-evident that this is not a comprehensive welfare analysis, neither at the individual 
or family level nor from a social point of view. Indeed, we neither account for the loss 
of leisure in the individual welfare metric, nor for eventual positive externalities linked 
with increased labour market participation.   21 








flat rate (in %)  39  38 
all families  1.3  2.5 
per decile 
1 -1.1  -0.8 
2 -3.9  -3.6 
3 -6.7  -6.0 
4 -4.4  -3.6 
5 -3.1  -2.1 
6 -1.3  -0.2 
7 0.5  1.7 
8 1.7  3.1 
9 4.5  6.1 
10 9.7  11.7 
per type of income 
wages and salaries  2.7  3.9 
replacement income  -6.1  -5.2 
self-employment income  6.3  8.0 
mixed income  11.8  14.0 
per family type 
single, <65, no children  3.6  4.7 
single, <65, with children  3.6  4.4 
single, >=65  -1.5  -0.7 
couple, <65, no children  1.1  2.6 
couple, <65, 1 child  2.1  3.5 
couple, <65, 2 children  3.6  5.0 
couple, <65, >=3 children  2.6  3.6 
couple, >= 65, no children  -9.4  -8.1 
couple, >= 65, with children  -6.9  -5.8   22 
6 CONCLUSION 
As a substitute for the present personal income tax, the flat tax is a textbook 
example of a trade-off between equity and efficiency. The lower marginal rate of a flat 
tax might improve incentives (at least in some part of the wage or gross income 
distribution). However, the constant marginal rate, even above an exempted minimum, 
leads to a reduction in progressivity and hence redistributive power of the personal 
income tax. 
Previous empirical research in Decoster and Van Camp (2005) or Valenduc (2006) on 
Belgian fiscal data already revealed that a realistic (i.e. budget-neutral) flat tax 
produces considerable adverse distributional effects. The analysis in this paper once 
more confirms this result. Advocates of the flat tax, however, rightly pointed out that 
these studies did not take into account the potential cost-recovery effect. In this paper 
we used a micro-econometric labour supply model and a micro-simulation model to 
counter this objection, without having to abandon the wealth of heterogeneity in the 
previous analysis. 
The results are clear: compared to a pure impact analysis in which the behavioural 
effects were neglected, we estimate the cost-recovery effect of a flat tax to be about  
€1,205 million. This follows from an increase in the labour supply by about 47,000 full-
time equivalents, in turn leading to an increase in revenue from personal income tax 
and social contribution revenues of €369 million and €639 million respectively, and to a 
decrease in unemployment benefits of €98 million. There is also a slight increase in the 
expenses for guaranteed minimum income benefits of €10 million and an increase in 
indirect tax revenue of €109 million. 
This appears to be a significant cost-recovery effect but is still rather limited. This is 
most obvious when we compare the revenue-neutral flat tax rate without and with 
cost-recovery effects. The cost-recovery effect allows the flat tax rate to diminish from 
38.5% to 37%. This confirms our previous results that advocating flat tax rates in the 
order of 20% or 25% is simply populistic. If not, advocates of such non revenue neutral 
rates should muster the intellectual honesty to make clear that not the flat tax itself but 
a strong reduction of government spending is the subject of political deliberation. 
We emphasize that our estimates probably represent an upper bound of the cost-
recovery effect. After all, we could only model labour supply, not demand or other 
general equilibrium effects. This means that we assume that everybody who offers 
extra labour effectively finds a matching demand for it. It goes without saying that this 
is too optimistic an assumption. Additionally, it cannot be ruled out that the estimates 
of the labour supply model itself are also affected by omitting the limitations on the 
d e m a n d  s i d e  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t . 22 Also other important reactions remain 
                                                      
22   See Bargain et al. (2005) for an empirical confirmation of this hypothesis.   23 
unmodelled in this paper: a change in evasion or avoidance behaviour, for instance, or 
shifting taxable income to other forms of declaration.  
The labour supply reactions do not change the very regressive nature of the flat tax 
reform. Especially without further refinements (like tax reductions for replacement 
incomes in the present system), a simplistic introduction of a flat tax seems to be 
politically unrealistic. The large gain in disposable income for the three highest deciles 
and the losses for the lower half of the income distribution seem a high price, for a 
limited positive incentive effect on the efficiency side of the economic coin. 
A topic that does deserve continued attention however is the high marginal tax 
burden on labour. For most individuals, the marginal tax rates calculated in this paper 
are over 50%, and for the participation taxes even between 60% and 80%. Of course, the 
treatment of social contributions as “taxes” is a point of view which is open to debate. 
Anyhow, we do not believe that a flat tax, at least in the form proposed in the Belgian 
public policy debate, provides a feasible, let alone “the best”, solution to this high tax 
burden on labour. Returning the flat tax discussion to the domain where it was initially 
introduced, in particular as a progressive consumption tax, however, may be much 
more promising. 
7  APPENDIX 
7.1  THE LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL 
Traditional approaches, based on the estimation of continuous labor supply functions, 
have proven computationally cumbersome even in the simplest case, let alone in the 
more complex cases in which multiple welfare program participation, the social stigma 
of benefit take up and the fixed cost of labor supply are considered. The modelisation 
of labour supply behaviour has been greatly simplified by the discrete approach 
proposed by van Soest (1995). The latter, in particular, builds on the observation that 
institutional constraints result in a limited set of working time alternatives (inactivity, 
some part-time categories, full-time and over-time), significantly reducing the 
computational burden of the estimation. 
Suppose that each partner in a couple may supply a finite number of working 
hours; each combination  j  of working hours of the partners  0,..., j J =  corresponds to 
a given level of gross labour market income. After adding non labour income and 
applying the microsimulation model, we derive the set of disposable incomes  ij C  (we 
suppose here that choice  0 j =  corresponds to non-participation) and each discrete 
bundle of leisure and income provides a different level of utility.23 
                                                      
23   The term leisure should be interpreted as non-labour market time.   24 
We assumed that each partner may work 0, 20, or 40 hours, corresponding to non 
participation, part-time, and full-time employment. It implies that a couple can choose 
among 9 alternative working hour combinations. Each alternative is characterized by a 
triplet of disposable income, leisure of the female partner and leisure of the male 
partner. 
The model is based on random utility: the utility household i derives from making 
choice  j ,  ij V , corresponds to the sum of the deterministic part of utility  ij U , which is 
assumed to depend on a function of spouses' leisure  j Lf  ,  j Lm , disposable income 
ij C and household characteristics  i Z , and of a random term  ij ε , unknown to the 
econometrician, but possibly known by the agents:24 
  ( ) ,, , . ij ij ij ij i ij VU L f L m C Z ε =+  (1.1) 
  If the error term  ij ε is assumed to be identically and independently distributed 
across alternatives and households according to a extreme value distribution, 
McFadden (1974) proves that the probability that alternative k  is chosen by household 
i is given by: 
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Conditional on a functional specification of the utility function, it is possible to 
estimate the preference parameters. In the following, we assume a quadratic 
specification of the utility function, as in Blundell et al. (2000): 
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We allow preferences to vary across households through taste-shifters on the 
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where  c X ,  l Xf, and  l Xm are vectors of observed heterogeneity (age, number and 
age of children). 
 
                                                      
24   Leisure,  j Lf  and  j Lm  are respectively defined as 80 j Hf −  and 80 j Hm − , where  j Hf  and 
j Hm  represent hours worked by the female and male respectively.   25 
7.1.1 Wage estimation 
In order to simulate the budget constraint of each household, we need gross labour 
income at different hours worked. The standard hypothesis is that the hourly wage is 
fixed, so that gross labour income corresponds to gross hourly wage times the amount 
of hours worked. The gross hourly wage is derived for all employees by dividing the 
gross monthly wage by the number of hours worked per month. We then still have to 
impute a wage rate for inactive and unemployed workers. For this purpose the hourly 
wage was first estimated (separately for males and females) on the whole sample of 
individuals in working age (either employed, unemployed or inactive) using a 
Heckman correction model (Heckman, 1976; Heckman, 1979) and using four years of 
pooled budget survey data: 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. Predicted wages were used in 
the estimation of the labour supply model only for households where one or both 
partners were out of employment. 
Estimates of the wage equations are presented in Table 7-1.  The signs of most 
coefficients are as expected and correspond to what is found in other studies (e.g. 
Orsini, 2008). We also observe a selection bias that is more pronounced for females 
than for males which is consistent with what is found in other countries 
(Choudhuri, 1993).  
7.1.2 Estimation of the labour supply model 
The parameter estimates of the labour supply model for couples, single females, and 
single males, corresponding to equations (1.3) and (1.4), are shown in Table 7-2, Table 
7-3, and Table 7-4 respectively.   26 
TABLE 7-1 WAGE EQUATION FOR FEMALES AND MALES (MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD HECKMAN CORRECTION)
1 
 Females  Males 
 Coeff.  Std. Err.   Coeff.  Std. Err.   
hourly wage rate (ln)            
primary education  0.081 0.041 *  0.046 0.035   
lower secondary education  0.265 0.037 ***  0.185 0.032  *** 
higher secondary education  0.502 0.038 ***  0.337 0.033  *** 
higher non-university education  0.788 0.039 ***  0.561 0.034  *** 
university education  0.966 0.042 ***  0.783 0.035  *** 
potential experience2  0.433 0.019 ***  0.324 0.023  *** 
potential experience squared2  -0.078 0.004 ***  -0.037 0.005  *** 
living in Flanders  -0.031 0.014 **  -0.056 0.015  *** 
living in Brussels  0.009 0.012   -0.027 0.014  * 
observed in budget survey 2000  -0.170 0.017 ***  -0.141 0.014  *** 
observed in budget survey 2001  -0.163 0.017 ***  -0.164 0.014  *** 
observed in budget survey 2002  -0.148 0.017 ***  -0.102 0.015  *** 
constant  1.384 0.043 ***  1.822 0.044  *** 
selection equation: employment (1= in employment) 
observed in budget survey 2000  -0.319 0.041 ***  -0.130 0.057  ** 
observed in budget survey 2001  -0.314 0.042 ***  -0.107 0.059  * 
observed in budget survey 2002  -0.373 0.042 ***  -0.199 0.058  *** 
partner works (1=yes)  -0.032 0.024   0.535 0.044  *** 
number of children under 3  -0.189 0.040 ***  0.348 0.084  *** 
number of children between 3 and 6  -0.158 0.037 ***  0.241 0.080  *** 
age  1.949 0.096 ***  3.090 0.129  *** 
age squared  -0.252 0.012 ***  -0.351 0.016  *** 
primary education  0.328 0.080 ***  0.531 0.096  *** 
lower secondary education  0.659 0.071 ***  0.874 0.086  *** 
higher secondary education  1.060 0.069 ***  1.022 0.084  *** 
higher non-university education  1.465 0.073 ***  1.177 0.088  *** 
university education  1.579 0.082 ***  1.298 0.098  *** 
constant  -3.762 0.200 ***  -6.330 0.262  *** 
       
rho   0.915 0.008   -0.168 0.056   
sigma  0.466 0.006   0.392 0.004   
lambda  0.426 0.008   -0.066 0.022   
Number of obs  8350  7577 
censored 2874  1119 
not censored  5476  6458 
Log-likelihood -6579.90  -5588.11 
Wald Chi2 (12)  1932.43  1822.02 
LR test of independent equations  319.92  6.32 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 Females and males aged between 18 and 65 either employed, unemployed or inactive 
2 Potential experience is defined as current age net of years of schooling and the age when schooling starts (6) 
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TABLE 7-2 ESTIMATES OF PREFERENCE STRUCTURE: COUPLES 
 Coeff.  Std. Err.   
Income  4.366 0.815  *** 
x Age female  -0.127 0.041  *** 
x Age female squared  0.199 0.051  *** 
x Age male  -0.015 0.022   
x Age male squared  -0.005 0.028   
x Number of children  0.028 0.056   
Income squared  0.007 0.023   
Leisure male  -0.343 0.025  *** 
x Age male  0.011 0.001  *** 
x Age male squared  -0.013 0.002  *** 
x Number of children  0.006 0.002  *** 
Leisure male squared  0.004 0.000  *** 
Leisure female  -0.220 0.020  *** 
x Age female  0.012 0.001  *** 
x Age female squared  -0.018 0.001  *** 
x Number of children <=3 years  -0.018 0.003  *** 
x Number of children >3 and <=6 years  -0.019 0.003  *** 
x Number of children >6 and <=12 years  -0.015 0.002  *** 
x Number of children >12 years  -0.010 0.002  *** 
Leisure female squared  0.000 0.000  *** 
Income x Leisure male  -0.015 0.003  *** 
Income x Leisure female  -0.014 0.002  *** 
Leisure male x Leisure female  0.001 0.000  *** 
      
Observations 4827 
Log-lokelihood -5988.21 
Wald Chi2(5)  34.76 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1% 
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TABLE 7-3 ESTIMATES OF PREFERENCE STRUCTURE: SINGLE FEMALES 
 Coeff.  Std. Err.   
Income 13.026  2.985 *** 
x Age female  -0.334  0.140 ** 
x Age female squared  0.389  0.159 ** 
x Number of children  0.287  0.151 * 
Income squared  -0.201  0.137  
Leisure female  -0.225  0.056 *** 
x Age female  0.009  0.003 *** 
x Age female squared  -0.012  0.003 *** 
x Number of children <=3 years  -0.012  0.008  
x Number of children >3 and <=6 years  -0.010  0.007  
x Number of children >6 and <=12 years  -0.002  0.005  
x Number of children >12 years  0.016  0.005 *** 
Leisure female squared  0.003  0.000 *** 
Income x Leisure female  -0.094  0.012 *** 
      
Observations 1896 
Log-lokelihood -1379.19 
Wald Chi2(3)  7.68 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1% 
 
TABLE 7-4 ESTIMATES OF PREFERENCE STRUCTURE: SINGLE MALES 
 Coeff.  Std. Err.   
Income 8.772  2.973  *** 
x Age male  -0.233  0.135  * 
x Age male squared  0.232  0.149   
Income squared  0.268  0.066  *** 
Leisure male  -0.278  0.056  *** 
x Age male  0.009  0.003  *** 
x Age male squared  -0.012  0.003  *** 
x Number of children  0.011  0.004  *** 
Leisure male squared  0.004  0.000  *** 
Income x Leisure male  -0.068  0.007  *** 
       
Observations 1699 
Log-lokelihood -1096.94 
Wald Chi2(5)  4.34 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1% 
7.1.3 Model calibration and labour supply responses 
In this subsection, we briefly describe how labour supply responses and revenue 
effects shown in the main text were arrived at.    29 
The estimation of the model explained in the previous section allows to determine 
the deterministic part of the utility function in (1.1) for each possible labour supply 
choice. The next step is to replicate observed labour supply in the baseline scenario by 
adding to the deterministic part a random term such that the actually observed number 
of hours worked is also the optimal choice predicted by the model, i.e. provides the 
highest utility. 
This calibration consists in drawing sets of random utility terms  ij ε   from the 
relevant distribution (extreme value), one for each combination of hours worked 
(maximum 9 for couples in our case). For each potential choice of labour supply the 
random term is then added to the deterministic part of utility corresponding to that 
choice. The labour supply predicted by the model is the one having the highest 
calculated (stochastic) utility (deterministic part plus random utility part). If the 
predicted choice corresponds to the observed one the corresponding heterogeneity 
term  ij ε  is retained. The process continues until a random utility term is found for each 
observation that makes the preferred choice predicted by the model correspond to the 
observed one. These steps are repeated 100 times resulting in 100 heterogeneity terms 
for each observation (one heterogeneity term for each run of the loop that makes the 
predicted choice in that run correspond to the observed one).  
To determine labour supply responses, we calculate the deterministic part of the 
utility function in (1.1) for every possible labour supply choice in each of the reform 
situations (different flat tax rates resulting in different disposable incomes). We again 
loop a 100 times and at each run and for each reform scenario we determine the utility 
for all possible labour supply choices by adding to the respective deterministic utility 
parts the random utility term, found in the corresponding run of the calibration step. 
The stochastic utilities, the  ij V ’s, are compared across the different combinations of 
hours worked and the predicted choice is the one that results in maximum utility.  
The end result are 100 predictions of labour supply for each individual and for each 
reform scenario. From this, probabilities can be derived by dividing by 100 the number 
of times a certain hours combination is predicted by the model. These probabilities are 
then used to estimate all the results with flexible labour supply for different flat tax 
scenarios shown in the text, e.g. personal income taxes for a single female in a reform 
scenario with a flat tax rate of 37% are obtained by a weighted average of personal 
income taxes due were she to work 0, 20, or 40 hours while facing a tax rate of 37%, the 
weights being the probabilities of choosing that particular number of hours. 
7.2  THE COST RECOVERY EFFECT WITH A NON REVENUE NEUTRAL FLAT TAX 
In Table 11 we present estimates of the cost recovery effect, as it is often used in 
public discussion. In the second row of the table we give the initial cost of a chosen flat 
tax rate in a scenario with fixed labour supply, unchanged consumption and excluding   30 
government spending on social assistance. This is compared in the line below with the 
revenue of this same tax rate after labour supply adjustments have been taken into 
account as well as changes in indirect tax revenue. The difference between the two is 
the cost recovery in absolute terms (in millions of €). Relating this absolute cost 
recovery to very different initial costs evidently shows up in percentage cost recoveries 
that are not comparable. Speaking about cost recovery in percentage terms only makes 
sense when comparing tax reforms that have the same initial impact on the budget. 
TABLE 11: COST RECOVERY FOR DIFFERENT FLAT TAXES (IN MILLION € AND IN % OF THE INITIAL COST) 
  Net revenue in baseline (2005): €80,058 million 
  flat rate (in %) 
  25  30 35  36 37 38  39 
net revenue, no 
behavioral adjustment 
66,570 71,575  76,579  77,580  78,580  79,581 80,582 
initial cost (mio €)  -13,488  -8,483  -3,479  -2,478  -1,478  -477  524 
net revenue, after 
behavioral adjustment 
70,376 74,501  78,582  79,395  80,191 81,002  81,802 
final cost (mio €)  -9,682  -5,557  -1,476  -663  133  944  1,744 
cost  recovery  (mio  €)  3,806  2,926 2,003  1,815 1,611 1,421  1,220 
cost recovery in % of 
initial cost 
28.2 34.5  57.6  73.2 109.0  297.9  -232.8   31 
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